A Vision for a Diplomatic Diversity Economy
Dr. Saad Salloum
Faculty of Political Science at Al-Mustansiriyah University, Department of International Relations
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of the dictatorial regime, diaspora elites had promising opportunities to contribute to the formation of a pluralistic democratic system and reconstruction after decades of total closure to the international community, coupled with the devastating effects of a continuous cycle of international sanctions, wars, and conflicts with neighboring countries.
A minority of Iraqi diaspora elites were able to return through the platform of opposition political parties in the diaspora to contribute to building the new political system, elites that shaped the rhythm and course of the political process of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, by holding political positions in ministries and governorates and leading various top executive sectors. The most prominent example of the influence of diaspora elites is that six of Iraq’s successive prime ministers have come from the diaspora community abroad: Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Iyad Allawi, Nouri al-Maliki, Haider al-Abadi, Adel Abdul Mahdi, and Mustafa al-Kadhimi, respectively (al-Sudani is the first prime minister from inside Iraq).
Therefore, it may seem strange to any observer that Iraqi political elites have not thought of developing creative diplomacy to employ and invest in the Iraqi diaspora, with its unique capabilities and potential. Iraqi diaspora communities from various components of Iraqi society are spread across many countries in the Middle East and the Arab world, and a large part of this diaspora is concentrated in the European Union, the United States, and other Western countries. There are possibilities for effective diplomatic employment of the capabilities and elements of power of this diaspora in enhancing the presence and status of the Iraqi state and its priorities in global decision-making centers, in light of the use of the economy of societal diversity, an idea that the researcher has already discussed in several of his books. E.g. Book: Creative Diversity 2013, Unity in Diversity 2015, and Identity Dynamics 2022.
Diaspora as part of the economy of societal diversity
The Economy of Community Diversity: Utilizing all the energies of society: Land, people, space, resources, and talents, both collective and individual, intergenerational experiences, history and civilizational heritage, millennial pluralistic cultural heritage, diaspora in different parts of the globe, etc. (Salloum: Toward a theory of managing creative diversity in Iraq, 2024).
The importance of diplomatic investment in the diaspora economy comes from the fact that governments and the private sector have traditionally viewed diasporas as continuous providers of financial capital. While the role of diasporas in “development” has been increasingly recognized, and diasporas are increasingly seen as important stakeholders in development, they are still not seen as important social investors by governments or the private sector. This is what we are trying to capture with our new concept of an alternative economy based on community diversity in general and the investment component of the diaspora economy in particular.
In this context, we do not focus on urging the Iraqi government, financial institutions, the private sector, and expatriates themselves to focus on utilizing expatriate investments as part of the development finance mix, especially as part of “blended finance” packages. Rather, we push the idea as part of an idea put forward by a researcher in the context of Diaspora Economics, namely the concept of the “Community Diversity Economy” (CDE).
In our new concept, we focus on the potential of investing in broader sectors than the traditional ones that make foreign policy captive to exclusive concepts and subject to traditional ideological orientations or inside-the-box thinking. The presence of Iraqi diaspora communities of social classes, intellectual elites, exceptional talents, businessmen, religious minority elites, and various ethnic groups represents a valuable opportunity to harness the talents, expertise, and investments of the diaspora and seek to expand their scope to achieve comprehensive socio-economic growth for the country, especially in light of the gap in funding available to achieve the SDGs on the one hand and the relationship with this diaspora turning into a gap that threatens a societal rift and a sociocultural divide between inside and outside.
Such diplomatic investment not only has a positive impact on an effective Iraqi foreign policy presence but also the domestic political environment in ethnic fault lines and fault lines. In other words, such investment could lead to a radical transformation in polarized, complex, and pluralistic environments such as the Nineveh Plain east of Mosul, Sinjar northwest of Mosul, and many other areas such as Kirkuk. In other words, it is capable of transforming the prevailing paradigms of thinking from one sociocultural system to another, more effective in achieving the foundations of sustainable stability.
Second, it has a parallel effect in strengthening the country’s soft power position in effective centers in the international system (Catholic Christians as an example in the relationship with the Holy See in the Vatican), Assyrians about the relationship with influential global capitals in Washington DC and Paris, for example), Yazidis and Kurds about the relationship with the German government, as well as the most present and diverse Iraqi community in Britain and the Assyrian and Mandaean communities in Australia, France, and other regions.
By capitalizing on the creative societal diversity and pluralistic human capital deployed abroad, Iraqi diplomacy can catalyze a more effective and influential Iraqi foreign policy in the regional and international arenas. In this context, the potential and influence of 350-450,000 Iraqis in Britain, from various components of society, according to estimates by the Iraqi Embassy in London, as well as promising possibilities to employ all the energies of other communities of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Shabak, Armenians, etc. in global decision-making centers in Berlin, London, and Washington DC. I will add to this the experiences of unique religious minorities such as the Chaldeans in Detroit (180,000), Assyrians in Chicago (35,000), Yazidis in Germany (200,000), and Mandaeans in Australia (50,000).
Diaspora and the flow of human capital over the past decades
The Iraqi diaspora reflects flowing communities of migrants who retain a sense of connection to their home country. Although this is an old phenomenon, it has become an important area of research in light of recent technological advances in communications and transportation that have highlighted the importance of links between this globally dispersed diaspora and the home country, resulting in diaspora populations from all components of society, classes, experiences, talents, and successes becoming increasingly important in areas such as international trade, foreign policy, and economic development.
Due to their unique transnational characteristics, the Iraqi diaspora can have a significant impact on economic exchange in several ways. Although Iraq is a country with an oil-based rent base, this resource will not be sustainable, so remittances from the diaspora can be thought of as a major source of capital for development.
The global mobility of Iraqi talent, i.e., brain drain, has resulted in the loss of irreplaceable capital, especially with the violent political and social transformations within the country, which prompted many countries to compete to attract Iraqi minds and talents and employ them to serve those countries, as in some Arab Gulf countries and neighboring countries such as Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. This is evidence that if Iraqi diaspora members play a crucial role in the formation of international entrepreneurial and business networks, because of their ability to help overcome language or cultural barriers, they represent a soft power that should not be lost and should be re-attracted to the home space.
A brief history of the formation of the Iraqi diaspora
During my research and academic travels over the past twenty years in many countries, I have noticed that the Iraqi diaspora lacks internal cohesion. This phenomenon can be explained in light of the contemporary historical context of the formation of the diaspora through successive waves of refugees and migrants, with different ideological leanings, social loyalties, ideological tendencies, and class affiliations, from the 1930s to the present.
The violent political shifts in contemporary Iraqi history are the root cause of the waves of migration that formed this heterogeneous body. A simplified historical outline of these flows can be drawn from a symbolic beginning in the 1930s with the exile and denaturalization of the Assyrians after the 1933 Semel massacre, who settled in Chicago in the United States and formed a dynamic and intelligent minority, as well as the Chaldeans who migrated to the United States since the end of the nineteenth century until the wave of migration after the Armenian massacre in Ottoman Turkey in 1915. So did the middle class of Iraqi Jews in 1950-1951.
After the revolution against the monarchy in 1958, the remaining Iraqi Jews and several Christians and monarchists emigrated to European countries, especially to Britain, which opened its doors to many religious minorities and monarchists – who were allies of Britain – to emigrate and settle in the United Kingdom.
The third wave of migration came after the Baathist coup in 1963, which overthrew the government of Abdulkarim Qasim. This time, most of the migrants belonged to the middle class. Then with the Baathist coup of 1968, the new wave included other victims, this time Kurds, Assyrians, and opponents of the regime from the middle class: Kurds, Assyrians, and middle-class opponents of the regime also fled, as many class and elites increasingly felt compelled to leave the country due to the general climate of repression that prevailed in the country, especially after Saddam Hussein’s rise to power
After the influx of leaders of the political left and Kurdish opposition political elites, the 1980s witnessed a new wave of Iraqi migrants. The Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1979 to 1988, led to the emigration of political activists from Islamist parties such as the Dawa Party, the Communist Party, and Kurdish parties. The next wave of migrants was a mixed mix of opposition and independent politicians, traders, and professionals, and was fueled by new talent and elites from the new generation between 1990 and 1991, during the second Gulf War and following the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings in northern and southern Iraq.
During 13 years of international sanctions, beginning with Security Council Resolution 661, which imposed an economic sanctions regime, and ending with Resolution 687, which introduced the country to a series of new restrictions, migration became a refuge and an option for those who could afford it. Although initially imposed by the United Nations in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, economic sanctions were renewed after the end of the war launched by the US-led international coalition targeting the destruction of the country’s civilian infrastructure, including electricity and sanitation facilities. These war attacks and intensive aerial bombing exacerbated the effects of the initial sanctions and made subsequent sanctions, perpetuated in UN Security Council Resolution 687, even more devastating, impacting the middle class, the education system, and the capabilities of cultural and economic elites and dealing a severe blow to the capital of the country.
After the occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the ensuing conflicts and civil war of 2006-2007, the diaspora was fueled by new waves of people fleeing the senseless and indiscriminate violence, including talented elites, what remained of the middle class, religious and ethnic minority elites, businessmen and capital owners. These waves formed a reluctant diaspora, which had a decisive say in the political changes after the US invasion and the establishment of a pluralistic democratic system in the country following the overthrow of the dictatorship.
Then, with the latest threat posed by the terrorist organization ISIS in 2014, a growing number of Iraqis found themselves in the diaspora. Some followed the same sequential migration pattern and joined their extended family in host countries to which it was possible to migrate for family reunification. Others took a more dangerous route, traveling on illegal journeys to Europe. With the wave of mass protests after 2019, the young post-ISIS generation found itself faced with a similar choice. This created a serious social rift between the internal political environment and the diaspora communities outside the country. This should be one of Iraq’s major foreign policy challenges.
In conclusion, as a result of the waves of migration and the diverse backgrounds of Iraqis, we find that the composition of the Iraqi diaspora in the countries of the world is very mixed and heterogeneous from the majority of the components of society, Shiite Arabs, Sunnis, and Sunni Kurds, while many other minorities form part of the diaspora map such as Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Sabean Mandaeans, Turkmen, Filipino Kurds, Jews, and so on. As a result of violent political transformations, the diaspora has become a representation of the social rift, while at the same time, from the perspective of the economy of societal diversity, it represents human capital that should be acquired and utilized for the benefit of the country, as soft power.
The latter goal should reshape Iraq’s foreign policy objectives in the coming years.
Toward Effective Diplomatic Utilization of the Iraqi Diaspora Economy
The first successful attempt to coordinate representatives of the Iraqi diaspora abroad dates back to 1990 following the invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi opposition saw this as an opportunity to influence international policymakers in London and Washington and push for a change in Iraq’s dictatorial political regime.
It was in this context that the INC emerged and, along with other opposition groups, worked with the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to push for a change in Saddam Hussein’s regime. The attempt was largely successful in pushing an international agenda for regime change and eventually actually pursuing it through the implementation of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act.
In the run-up to the invasion following the events of September 11, 2001, opposition groups were working to strengthen their relations with the US-led coalition, in preparation for forming part of the new government once military intervention and regime change took place. Several groups in the Iraqi diaspora focused on providing humanitarian relief during the UN sanctions regime from 1991 to 2003.
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, diaspora elites were able to return to the country, and opportunities arose to contribute directly to reconstruction and the formation of a pluralistic democratic system. As noted in the example of six prime ministers of the Iraqi government from the diaspora community abroad. The opportunity was always there to effectively mobilize the diaspora community.
However, the nature of the constituent system prevented the productive utilization of this transnational human capital from the diaspora community. The structure of the constituent system created barriers to mobilizing the diaspora community and achieving cohesion within this pluralistic society in a productive manner, especially elites who are not ideologically linked to traditional political parties, although many opportunities have arisen for positive employment to contribute to building the diaspora economy in light of the concept of the economy of societal diversity and to propose an alternative economy to the oil rent economy.
There were golden moments that could have changed the nature of the prevailing paradigms. The most notable opportunity to unite the torn diaspora body abroad and begin a policy of smart employment of the economy of societal diversity came with the 2014 ISIS invasion. This existential threat to Iraq’s survival as a political and civilizational entity provided an opportunity for Iraqi citizens of all sects to unite in defense of the country’s unity. However, the lack of a unified vision in Iraqi diplomacy resulted in decision-makers not capitalizing on the opportunity to unite the diaspora with the Islamic State’s takeover of Nineveh province in 2014. Especially with the international support for the country in its war to liberate itself from the brutal terrorist organization.
During the successive events from 2014 to 2017, a common diaspora-induced quest for mobilization, the emergence of cross-border coordination, and the active participation of diasporas from all ethnic, social, and political backgrounds in protests against terrorism and in advocating for the protection of the pluralistic heritage destroyed by ISIS, and in response to its genocide and ethnic cleansing.
The second moment of unity was at the beginning of October 2019, when the protest movement in the country took on a unifying character between Iraqis inside and outside the country and demanded a national Iraqi identity that transcends confessionalism and better economic prospects for all citizens, a missed opportunity that was not invested in a reform process to employ this rare transconfessional spirit to build a common and inclusive national identity. The protests have turned into a new divisive moment due to the important pragmatism of viewing the protests as a threat rather than an opportunity for needed reform.
On the other hand, since 2013, the researcher has put forward a new concept to capitalize on community diversity, based on the need to unify the diaspora community, which is not a homogeneous body (Salloum, Creative Diversity, 2013). The call to create a platform for coordination or cooperation between different diaspora groups, within the framework of changing the dominant paradigm of political culture and characterizing societal diversity as a source of enrichment rather than a threat (Salloum, Identity Dynamics 2023, Salloum, Unity in Diversity 2015).
The visit of His Holiness Pope Francis to Iraq in 2021 added great importance to such a vision, which starts from looking at Iraq as a capital of religious diversity in the Middle East and the world, and the impact of this on cross-border employment, with its encouragement to use the capabilities and relationships of minority elites such as Yazidis, Turkmen, Faili Kurds, Sabean Mandaeans, Christians, and other components of society. The visit raised national and international awareness in a rare way of the importance of the country’s pluralistic heritage, and to think of promising economic possibilities as an alternative to oil rents. (Salloum, Francis in Ur, 2023).
Hence, there is an urgent need to conduct a preliminary initiative to build trust between the components of the Iraqi diaspora community as a first step, especially in light of the lack of an effective official institutional platform or initiative that can unify efforts or build an inclusive vision that allows for the investment of the diaspora economy and the expertise of expatriate elites.
In this context, we propose that the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Group convene a forum for the components and elites of the Iraqi diaspora, taking into account the different cultural specificities, in a way that opens horizons for continuous dialogue to agree on employment priorities for the diaspora community, and explore the various possibilities for investing in the economy of societal diversity to strengthen Iraq’s position and presence regionally and internationally.